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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law has undergone somewhat of a transformation in 
recent years, largely as a result of such scandals as Enron and World-
Com.1  If it is assumed that a failure in governance is partially, if not 
wholly, responsible for these corporate debacles, director conduct 
should be a focus of reform in the future.  Therefore, the common 
law business judgment rule should play a role in this reform.  The 
business judgment rule seeks to protect board members’ decisional 
authority, yet in doing so it may give them too much discretion.2  This 
Comment asserts that the business judgment rule, as applied against 
the standards of director conduct implicitly proposed by the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery in In re Disney Derivative Litigation,3 may be an 
appropriate mechanism for courts to meaningfully review board deci-
sions, thereby ensuring the good faith efforts of directors in their cor-
porate undertakings. 
The Disney decision provides useful guidelines that, while (ac-
cording to the court) inapplicable in the case itself, may steer courts, 
and directors themselves, in the right direction in the future.  As pre-
vious Delaware case law indicates,4 best practices, as articulated by 
 ∗   J.D., May 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. (Economics), 2001, 
Vassar College.   
 1 Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 
353, 353 (2004). 
 2 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 409–10 (2005). 
 3 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), 
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 4 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
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courts, can evolve into standards of conduct; the Disney decision has 
the potential to create such standards for directors.5
Despite corporate failures, courts continue to give directors the 
protection of the business judgment rule,6 perhaps because of the 
adoption by many of the “gatekeeper” theory of corporate failure.7  
This theory blames the failures on the inadequacies of the corporate 
gatekeepers—the corporations’ independent auditors and analysts—
and ignores, to some extent, the role played by directors in the down-
fall of their corporations.8  An alternative theory treats the collapses 
as a true failure of corporate governance, thus implicating the busi-
ness judgment rule and its role in protecting directors from liability.9  
Those that subscribe to this latter theory argue that if directors are 
allowed to act without limitation on their powers, scandals are likely 
to continue to occur.10
No matter the cause, the wave of corporate scandals roused a 
hope that there would be a shift toward imposing more stringent 
standards on corporate directors at the state level—standards 
deemed necessary to prevent similar problems in the future.11  This 
Comment will explore the events leading up to this anticipated shift 
and will discuss the transformation of Delaware corporate law since 
the failures of Enron, WorldCom, and others, in considering whether 
such a shift has occurred and whether such a shift is likely to ever  
occur. 
 5 See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight Responsibility in 
the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2001) (noting that the Caremark deci-
sion “has fueled the discussion of the board’s role in ensuring compliance”). 
 6 Fairfax, supra note 2, at 410.  For a discussion of the business judgment rule, 
see infra Part III.B. 
 7 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002), reprinted in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 125, 127 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
 8 Id. at 127, 130–31 (defining “gatekeepers” as those “reputational intermediar-
ies who provide verification and certification services to investors”). 
 9 Id. at 125. 
 10 See Fairfax, supra note 2, at 394–95. 
 11 Rolin P. Bissel, Delaware’s Disney Decision: A Star is Born?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, 
Vol. 20, No. 49, Oct. 7, 2005, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/ 
100705LBBissell.pdf (noting that the director-friendly business judgment rule is 
“thought by some to be over the hill in the post-Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley era”).  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself seems to assume that both theories—the gatekeeper 
theory and the governance theory—played a role in the failures.  See Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
7201–7266 (Supp. IV 2004) and in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 
U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003 and Supp. IV 2004)) (imposing regulations on both corporate 
gatekeepers and corporate agents). 
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Part II of this Comment provides a summary of the events lead-
ing up to the failure of Enron and other corporate debacles and sets 
forth the federal response to the failures thus far.12  Part II also looks 
at Delaware’s relationship with the federal government with respect 
to how the fear of federal intrusion shapes state law and judicial opin-
ions.13  Part II further examines Delaware’s reactions to Enron, not-
ing that Delaware indicated early on an unwillingness to change its 
judicial approach to shareholder suits despite the scandals and 
changes in federal corporate law.14  Part III provides a general over-
view of director fiduciary duties and their relationship to the business 
judgment rule.15  Part III also includes a brief look at the history of 
and policies behind the business judgment rule.16
Part IV examines recent case law in Delaware implicating the 
business judgment rule.  Part IV first looks at the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s 1996 decision in In re Caremark International, which re-
sulted in a modification of the standards of director oversight.17  Part 
IV next examines the Court of Chancery’s 2003 decision regarding 
the Disney litigation (Disney I), and then moves on to the 2005 deci-
sion (Disney II), both of which focus on director due care and good 
faith.18  Based on the analysis in Part IV, this Comment concludes that 
Delaware courts have, in the past, turned best practices into standards 
of conduct and argues that, despite commentary to the contrary, the 
Disney I decision is likely to serve as a signal to directors that conduct 
falling below the level of best practices will not be readily tolerated in 
the future.19
II. ENRON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
A. The Downfall 
Enron’s downfall resulted from a host of failures: the failure of 
the board to supervise properly the management of the company; the 
failure of corporate gatekeepers effectively to monitor corporate ac-
tivity; and the failure of institutional investors, stock analysts, and 
 12 See infra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 13 See infra Part II.C. 
 14 See infra Part II.C.1. 
 15 See infra Part III.A. 
 16 See infra Part III.B. 
 17 See infra Part IV.A. 
 18 See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C. 
 19 See infra Part V. 
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government regulators to realize exactly what was going on.20  Enron 
officials flagrantly abused accounting procedures—manipulating 
them to make the company appear substantially more profitable (and 
therefore a better investment) than it actually was.21
The prelude to Enron’s collapse, and the company’s ultimate 
failure, shocked the corporate world and the investing public.22  It 
was initially thought that the shock would wear off before long.23  The 
initial alarm, however, was magnified when similar problems were dis-
covered at WorldCom and other firms.24  Investigations relating to 
the collapse of Enron and WorldCom indicated that directors failed 
in fulfilling their duty to supervise and direct the management of the 
corporations.25  With directors seemingly incapable of handling their 
own affairs, the public demanded a governmental response.26
B. Federal Government’s Response to Enron 
1. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The federal government’s primary response to the corporate 
scandals was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Act” or “Sarbanes-
Oxley”).27  In passing the Act, Congress attempted to remedy the per-
ceived problems with corporate law that may have led to the financial 
crises of companies such as Enron and WorldCom.28  “The center-
piece of Sarbanes-Oxley is internal controls: the checks and balances 
that make sure public companies record assets, liabilities, and other 
items accurately on financial statements.  Under Sarbanes-Oxley, 
companies must make sure their controls are sound, then have an 
 20 D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, 
PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 312 (2004).   
 21 Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS 3, 13 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). 
 22 See William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s Duty of Inde-
pendence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004). 
 23 SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 312–13. 
 24 Id. at 313. 
 25 E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron/WorldCom 
Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2003). 
 26 SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 313. 
 27 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (Supp. IV 2004) and in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003 and Supp. IV 2004)).  The Act con-
sists of four laws: the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act of 2002, the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, the 
White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, and the Corporate Fraud Ac-
countability Act of 2002.  Id. 
 28 Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 358. 
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auditor sign off on them.”29  With respect to perceived regulatory 
problems in the accounting industry, for example, the Act created an 
accounting oversight board.30  Sarbanes-Oxley also instituted new au-
diting rules in response to the perceived problems with corporate 
gatekeepers.31
Another common link among corporations involved in corpo-
rate scandals, which Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to correct, is failure of the 
directors to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to the corporations, es-
pecially with respect to remaining adequately informed and monitor-
ing the dealings of other corporate actors.32  In addition to imple-
menting procedures to ensure director independence, a significant 
part of the legislation, known as rule 404, seeks to remedy this prob-
lem by imposing direct restrictions on corporations’ internal opera-
tions.33  The rule, which applies to public companies, requires corpo-
rations to conduct internal reviews of their own control systems and 
then to hire an outside auditor to authenticate the findings of the re-
view.34
Similarly, section 302 of the Act “requires a company’s CEO and 
CFO to certify in each annual or quarterly report both that they are 
responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls de-
signed to ensure that material information is made known to them 
and that they have evaluated the effectiveness of those controls.”35  
Taken together, the rules imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley increase direc-
tors’ responsibility to keep themselves adequately informed about 
corporate affairs. 
 29 Diya Gullapalli, Living with Sarbanes-Oxley: How Companies Are Coping in the New 
Era of Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R1. 
 30 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. IV 2004): 
The board is meant “to oversee the audit of public companies that 
are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to 
protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in 
the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit 
reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and held 
by and for, public investors.” 
Id. 
 31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 771–72.  
 32 Fairfax, supra note 2, at 398–99. 
 33 Deborah Solomon, At What Price? Critics Say the Cost of Complying with Sarbanes-
Oxley is a lot Higher Than it Should Be, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R3. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Fairfax, supra note 2, at 402. 
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C. Interplay Between State Law and Federal Law 
Traditionally, the internal operations of corporations have been, 
for the most part, governed by the law of their states of incorpora-
tion.36  Most significantly, this area of state governance includes the 
relationship between a corporation and its shareholders.37  The fed-
eral government plays a role in certain areas, especially with respect 
to the relationship between the corporation and the capital markets, 
but generally restrains itself from intruding on state matters.38  The 
exception to this rule, as observed by the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
is when the government observes conduct on the part of corporations 
that has the potential to harm the public.39  When the risk to the pub-
lic outweighs concerns of federalism, the federal government inter-
venes and regulates the states.40
Despite certain attempts on the part of Congress and the SEC, 
state law essentially reigned supreme in the arena of corporate law 
until the early twenty-first century.41  For example, when the issue of 
seemingly excessive executive compensation first came up, both the 
SEC and Congress responded by requiring disclosure in an issuer’s 
annual proxy statement regarding executive compensation, but these 
actions had little impact on matters of actual corporate governance.42  
These measures, adopted in the early 1990s, did not alter the execu-
tive compensation practices of most corporations.43  In effect, the 
federal government took control of the “external aspects of corporate 
behavior” and the states continued to regulate the internal affairs of 
the corporations.44
 36 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977). 
 37 Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 354. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Id. at 355.  Courts have been reluctant to allow too much federal intrusion 
in areas traditionally confined to state authority.  Id. at 355–56. 
 40 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Litigation Reform since the PLSRA: A Ten-
Year Perspective: Panel Three: Sarbanes-Oxley Governance Issues: Federal Corporate Law: Les-
sons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1829 (2006) (noting that “thus far . . . fed-
eral intervention [into corporate law] typically has been limited to periods of finan-
cial crisis”). 
 41 Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 355–57. 
 42 Id. at 356: 
“The Commission promulgated a set of rules that dramatically in-
creased the amount of disclosure regarding executive compensa-
tion in an issuer’s annual proxy statement . . . .  Congress . . . 
amend[ed] the tax code to limit the deductibility of executive 
compensation in excess of $1 million . . . .” 
Id. 
 43 Id. at 357. 
 44 Id. 
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1. Delaware and the Federal Government 
State corporate statutes, especially those in Delaware, are largely 
pro-director, vesting corporate board members with a significant 
amount of power.45  Delaware generally tries to avoid federal inter-
ference, and thus maintain its pro-director stance, by checking its 
own laws in response to how it thinks federal law will handle certain 
issues.46  Thus, even if matters remain in the domain of state law, the 
risk of federal action has the power to influence, and at times dictate, 
Delaware law.47  This trend is promoted by the fact that the federal 
government has authority to reverse state corporate law with which it 
does not agree.48
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act marked the first real attempt on the 
part of the federal government to regulate matters traditionally gov-
erned by the states, and Delaware was expected to react in a way that 
would impede further federal encroachment.49  Unsurprisingly, 
shortly following Enron, Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery responded by noting that “[r]isk-free capitalism is 
an oxymoron, and we endanger much by tampering with a system of 
corporate governance that, while imperfect, continues to serve our 
nation well.”50  Likewise, Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court stated his opinion that “[c]ourts should be re-
luctant to interfere with or second-guess the good faith business deci-
sions of directors,” thereby reinforcing the importance of the 
business judgment doctrine even in the post-Enron context.51
These comments reflect a certain disinclination on the part of 
the Delaware judiciary to change the way it addresses shareholder de-
rivative actions, and thus the way it examines director conduct.  
Courts in general are instructed to “err on the side of the directors” 
and to “recognize that directors can only be expected to fulfill” lim-
ited and defined duties.52  Moreover, Vice Chancellor Strine made a 
point of noting that Enron was not a Delaware corporation, again in-
 45 See Fairfax, supra note 2, at 396. 
 46 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591–92 (2003) 
(“[W]hen . . . matters formally remain matters of Delaware law, if the risk of federal 
action heavily influences Delaware, it follows that even when federal authorities do 
not take the issue away, federal power may make Delaware law.”). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 592. 
 49 See Veasey, supra note 25, at 842, 844. 
 50 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact?  Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law 
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1374 (Aug. 2002). 
 51 Veasey, supra note 25, at 849. 
 52 Strine, supra note 50, at 1393 (emphasis omitted). 
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dicating an unwillingness to change the way Delaware, in particular, 
conducts itself.53  While recognizing that shareholder suits were likely 
to continue or, more likely, increase, following Enron, Vice Chancel-
lor Strine indicated no desire to change the way such claims should 
be evaluated.54
To be sure, some viewed the decision in Disney I55 as a “prime ex-
ample” of Delaware’s reaction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, noting that 
the Act and surrounding talk about corporate governance have 
“pushed Delaware to view director actions more critically.”56  But if 
the Disney I was a reaction to the potential of federal intrusion, the 
Disney II decision was equally a response to critics, who viewed Disney I 
as being an unreasonable application of the business judgment rule.57  
Yet as will be seen, Disney II, while not imposing liability on the direc-
tors, may have the effect of creating higher standards for director 
conduct in the future. 
III.     FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
A. Fiduciary Duties 
Delaware’s reluctance to react to the imminent intrusion of the 
federal government following Enron rests in part on the insistence 
that directors should be left in charge of their corporations.58  Direc-
tors are fiduciaries of the corporations they manage.59  Generally, di-
rectors have two principal duties—the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty.60  The duty of care covers a director’s individual actions with 
respect to the corporation, as well as the director’s obligation to su-
pervise and keep himself or herself informed regarding corporate ac-
 53 Id. at 1373 n.5. 
 54 See id. at 1374. 
 55 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), 
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  See infra Part IV. 
 56 See, e.g., David Marcus, Disney’s Dudley Do-wrong in Delaware, CORP. CONTROL 
ALERT, July 23, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.  
 57 See David Marcus, The New Disney Ruling: A Response to Changing Times, DEL. L. 
WKLY., Aug. 31, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library.  
 58 Veasey, supra note 25, at 842. 
 59 See, e.g., Harvey Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 
61 TEMP. L. REV. 13, 13–14 (1988) (“In the traditional corporate model the board of 
directors, which is elected by the shareholders, is given the ultimate power to man-
age the corporation.  With this grant of power there comes responsibility, and direc-
tors are viewed as fiduciaries with certain duties to their corporations.”). 
 60 WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 150, 164 (8th ed. 2002). 
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tivity.61  Under the duty of care, corporate officers and directors are 
charged with exercising the care, skill, and prudence of “like persons 
in a like position” in making corporate decisions.62  This language 
would suggest that directors and officers may be held liable for negli-
gence, yet the imposition of liability for a breach of the duty of care is 
very rare.63  As such, the duty is imposed largely as an aspirational 
guideline, but on some occasions, it is also used as a liability-creating 
rule.64
Under Delaware law, the standard for proving a violation of the 
duty of care, in most cases, is gross negligence with a presumption of 
good faith in favor of the directors.65  Further, even where directors 
are held to have breached the duty, they can escape liability by prov-
ing the “entire fairness” of the transaction.66  The “entire fairness” 
standard requires directors to prove the transaction had (1) a fair 
price (at which point the substantive merits of the decision are con-
sidered), and (2) fair dealing.67
The second fiduciary duty, the duty of loyalty, is imposed largely 
to prevent officers and directors from using “their position of trust 
and confidence to further their private interests.”68  The most com-
mon breaches of the duty of loyalty include engaging in self-dealing 
transactions, failure to disclose a corporate opportunity to the corpo-
ration, unfair competition, and resisting a corporate takeover that 
may be in the best interest of the shareholders.69  The duty essentially 
requires that a director act in the best interest of the corporation, 
putting aside his or her own interests in favor of those of the share-
holders.70
 61 Fairfax, supra note 2, at 397. 
 62 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 150. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 151.  The situations in which liability is most likely to be imposed are 
those involving an undisclosed conflict of interest on the part of the director, or 
where the director was knowingly inattentive.  See id. 
 65 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 66 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995). 
 67 Id. at 1162–63. 
 68 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 69 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 165–70. 
 70 Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000). 
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B. The Business Judgment Rule 
1. General Principles 
The business judgment rule is one of the most important doc-
trines in all of corporate law.71  The rule acts as a shield to director 
liability by protecting directors and officers from liability for bad or 
harmful business decisions as long as the contested decision was “in-
formed.”72  Simply put, the business judgment rule is a qualifying rule 
on corporate directors’ fiduciary duties, directing courts not to exam-
ine the substantive merits of business decisions.73
The business judgment rule protects corporate directors’ deci-
sions from substantive review if four conditions are met.74  First, the 
board must exercise its business judgment by making a decision.75  
Second, the board must utilize a reasonable decision making process, 
i.e., board members must take reasonable steps to become adequately 
informed as to all material information available about the decision.76  
Third, the board must have acted in good faith in making the deci-
sion.77  Finally, the decision must have been made by a disinterested 
board.78
The Delaware Supreme Court has described the rule as follows: 
It is a presumption that in making a business decision the direc-
tors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best in-
terests of the company.  Absent an abuse of discretion, that judg-
ment will be respected by the courts.  The burden is on the party 
 71 See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 83 (2004) (“The business judgment rule pervades every aspect of 
state corporate law, from the review of allegedly negligent decisions by directors, to 
self-dealing transactions, . . . and so on.”). 
 72 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985). 
 73 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).  In Brehm, the court ex-
pressed its view that the concept of “substantive due care” is “foreign to the business 
judgment rule.”  Id.  Although the business judgment rule affects both of the fiduci-
ary duties, it is most directly tied to the duty of care.  See Douglas M. Branson, Intra-
corporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 97–98 
(1989). 
 74 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 441 (1993). 
 75 Id.  A decision not to act also meets this requirement.  Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presump-
tion.79
A plaintiff seeking to overcome the business judgment rule must 
take several steps.  First, the plaintiff must rebut the presumption that 
the decision was informed.80  The presumption can be rebutted by a 
showing of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing on the part of the direc-
tors, or by demonstrating that the directors have made “an unintelli-
gent or unadvised judgment.”81  Although Delaware courts currently 
describe the rule as non-substantive,82 director liability under the 
business judgment rule “is predicated upon concepts of gross negli-
gence.”83  If a plaintiff fails to prove gross negligence with respect to 
whether the decision was “informed,” he or she is not entitled to any 
remedy.84  If, however, the plaintiff is successful in rebutting the pre-
sumption, the burden then shifts to the directors to prove the “trans-
action was entirely fair.”85
In the landmark case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Su-
preme Court held the directors of Trans Union Corporation (a pub-
lic corporation), liable for approving the sale of the company in a 
merger transaction essentially because they ignored possible better 
offers.86  The court focused on evidence that the board did not spend 
adequate time in deciding to approve the merger and that there was 
no documentation to speak of concerning the transaction.87  Fur-
thermore, there was evidence that the corporation’s senior manage-
ment opposed going through with the sale.88  In light of these proce-
dural defects, the court concluded that the decision could not have 
been an exercise of proper business judgment.89  The Van Gorkom 
court thereby applied the business judgment rule to review the 
 79 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (internal citations omitted). 
 80 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 81 Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-W. Glass, 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933)). 
 82 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 746–47 
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
663 A.2d 1156, 1165 (Del. 1995). 
 83 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812). 
 84 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 85 Id. (internal citations omitted).  For a discussion of the entire fairness stan-
dard, see supra Part III.A. 
 86 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. 
 87 Id. at 869, 874.  The court relied specifically on evidence that the board agreed 
to the transaction after meeting for only two hours, without so much as reviewing a 
term sheet of the contemplated transaction.  Id. 
 88 Id. at 867. 
 89 Id. at 874. 
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method by which the board made the contested decision.90  Under 
this rule, if the process used to make a decision is not reached in an 
“informed and deliberate manner,” the directors are not entitled to 
the protection of the business judgment rule.91
2. Policy Behind the Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule can be understood as a device to re-
lieve the pressure on courts to analyze business decisions.92  From a 
judicial perspective, the rule recognizes that courts have little ability 
to adequately evaluate corporate issues.93  From a business perspec-
tive, the rule recognizes that some risk is required, and even desir-
able, in the business context.  Thus, liability cannot be imposed for 
every deviation from paradigmatic conduct on the part of board 
members.94
The business judgment rule embodies the tension between au-
thority and accountability that underlies all of corporate law.95  On 
the one hand, directors need to have enough authority to effectively 
manage their corporations.96  On the other hand, there must be rules 
in place to hold board members accountable for misuse of their 
power.97  This tension has driven much of the controversy over the 
business judgment rule to date.98
IV.     REACTION IN THE COURTS 
After Enron, it was expected that there would be a shift toward 
imposing more stringent standards on corporate directors to better 
protect shareholder interests.99  While some action has been taken on 
the federal level, the questions now are what, if anything, has Dela-
ware learned from the corporate failures, and how will it choose to 
respond to the changes in federal standards governing corporate law.  
The following cases suggest that while the expected shift has not yet 
 90 Id. at 874–88. 
 91 Id. at 873. 
 92 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993). 
 93 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 746 (Del. 
Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 94 Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 95 See Bainbridge, supra note 71, at 84. 
 96 Id. at 84–85. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate 
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 11–12 (2005). 
 99 See generally Bissel, supra note 11. 
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fully occurred, change is in the air—change that will serve to protect 
shareholders from rampant managerial opportunism. 
A. In re Caremark 
Apart from their decision-making function, corporate directors 
are charged with the responsibility of monitoring the corporation’s 
management.100  This duty includes oversight of the corporation’s 
policies with respect to compliance with laws and regulations.101  
While compliance with the law is generally advisable, it has never 
been clearly established that boards are required to ensure such com-
pliance.102  In re Caremark is illustrative of this point.103
Caremark International, Inc. was engaged in providing health 
care services.104  It was prosecuted for violating the federal Anti-
Referral Payments Law for making certain “consulting” and “re-
search” payments to health care providers who recommended pa-
tients to Caremark.105  Caremark ultimately settled with both the gov-
ernment and various private entities for more than $250 million.106  
Based on the events of the criminal proceedings, several derivative ac-
tions were filed against Caremark.107  Caremark also settled these 
claims, promising to discontinue the disputed practices and to create 
a new compliance committee.108
In In re Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery was called 
upon to evaluate the resulting settlement agreement.109  The underly-
ing suit alleged breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the directors 
for failure to detect and correct violations of state and federal law by 
certain Caremark employees.110  While approving the settlement as 
fair and reasonable, the court established that directors may be held 
personally liable for losses resulting from a corporation’s failure to 
act in accordance with applicable legal standards.111  Further, the de-
 100 See Brown, supra note 5, at 14–15. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 6. 
 103 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 104 Id. at 961. 
 105 Id. at 964. 
 106 Id. at 961. 
 107 Id. at 964. 
 108 Id. at 966. 
 109 698 A.2d at 960–61. 
 110 Id. at 960. 
 111 Id. at 970. 
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cision suggested an elevation of directors’ monitoring duties.112  
Chancellor Allen, who authored the opinion, determined that: 
[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith 
to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, 
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to 
do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a 
director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applica-
ble legal standards.113
The Chancellor’s suggestion that boards should be responsible 
for ensuring corporate compliance with the laws was influenced by 
the “increasing tendency, especially under federal law, to employ the 
criminal law to assure corporate compliance with external legal re-
quirements.”114  Specifically, the Chancellor found that the adoption 
of the federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations—which im-
posed enhanced penalties on corporations convicted of crimes—
provided “powerful incentives for corporations” to implement effec-
tive compliance systems.115
The 1963 decision of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., however, 
provided that “absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the 
directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to 
ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”116  
Chancellor Allen was able to distinguish Graham by interpreting it to 
stand for the proposition that “absent grounds to suspect deception, 
neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with 
wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the 
honesty of their dealings on the company’s behalf.”117  Further, an in-
terpretation of Graham that “a corporate board has no responsibility 
to assure that appropriate information and reporting systems are es-
tablished by management . . .  would not, in any event, be accepted by 
the Delaware Supreme Court in 1996.”118  Again relying on the new 
federal Sentencing Guidelines for support, the court found that 
“[a]ny rational person attempting in good faith to meet an organiza-
tional governance responsibility would be bound to take [the en-
hanced penalties] into account . . . .”119
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 114 Id. at 969. 
 115 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969. 
 116 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
 117 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969. 
 118 Id. at 969–70. 
 119 Id. at 970. 
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Caremark was not an official ruling on the subject and arguably 
undermined existing Delaware Supreme Court precedent.120  The de-
cision has, however, been influential with respect to the conduct of 
Delaware corporations.121  For example, it is now standard practice 
for corporate attorneys to advise clients to adopt comprehensive 
compliance programs, providing for increased communication with 
employees, rigorous monitoring and auditing, and discipline for per-
ceived violations.122  Furthermore, Caremark’s proposition that com-
pliance with the laws is part of a directors’ duty to monitor “finds sub-
stantial agreement and support in the corporate governance thinking 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the American Law Insti-
tute, and the American Bar Association.”123
While articulating what were essentially best practices, the pro-
posed standards that came out of Caremark opinion have been taken 
to heart by both business entities and the courts.124  The decision has 
successfully heightened the level of attention directors pay to their 
oversight responsibilities under the duty of care.125  Caremark there-
fore suggests that best practices can evolve into the industry standard 
with respect to director duties in Delaware. 
B. Disney I 
1. The Facts 
Before delving into the most recent in the string of decisions 
that came out of the Disney shareholder litigation, it is useful to look 
at the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2003 opinion regarding this 
case.  The facts of the case are briefly summarized here.  Disney’s 
Chairman and CEO, Michael Eisner, sought to engage Michael Ovitz 
as its new president.126  In October of 1995, Eisner eventually suc-
ceeded, but only after offering Ovitz an enticing contract.127
 120 Veasey, supra note 25, at 850. 
 121 See Brown, supra note 5, at 6. 
 122 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 155. 
 123 Brown, supra note 5, at 31–32. 
 124 See Veasey, supra note 25, at 849–50 (“Such compliance systems could reasona-
bly be expected to identify wrongdoing when a compliance program could benefit 
the corporation under federal sentencing guidelines . . . .  [M]y personal view is that 
the expectations of directors . . . progressed in the thirty-plus years from Graham to 
Caremark.”). 
 125 Brown, supra note 5, at 144. 
 126 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 700–01 (Del. 
Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 127 Id. at 703, 711. 
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The most interesting provision of the contract, and indeed the 
provision from which the litigation arose, was the provision concern-
ing the termination of the contract.  Ovitz’s employment agreement 
(OEA) provided certain terms under which Ovitz would be permitted 
to leave the company without penalty.128  If Ovitz left for any other 
reason, he would forfeit any right to outstanding benefits under the 
OEA and could be prevented “from working for a competitor.”129  If, 
on the other hand, Ovitz was fired without cause (that is, for any rea-
son besides gross negligence or malfeasance), Disney would be 
obliged to make a payment—the non-fault termination (NFT)—
consisting of his remaining salary under the OEA and $7.5 million a 
year, which represented unaccrued bonuses.130  In addition, the first 
tranche of Ovitz’s options would vest immediately upon termination, 
and he would receive a payment of $10 million for the second 
tranche.131
As is often the case with Hollywood power couples, what was ex-
pected to be a happy marriage between Eisner and Ovitz faded very 
quickly.  Problems, largely due to Ovitz’s failure to adapt to Disney’s 
corporate culture, arose as early as January 1996, just three months 
after his tenure as president officially began.132  By the fall of the same 
year, it became apparent that the difficulties were not likely to be re-
solved, and that Ovitz, one way or another, would have to leave the 
company.133
In September of 1996, Sanford Litvack, Disney’s general counsel, 
approached Ovitz and advised him that it would be best if Ovitz 
started looking for new employment.134  Litvack further conveyed that 
“Eisner no longer wanted Ovitz at Disney.”135  Ovitz contemplated 
[T]he non-contentious terms of Ovitz’s employment agreement (the 
“OEA”) were $1 million in annual salary and a performance-based, dis-
cretionary bonus . . . .  Ovitz would receive a five-year contract with two 
tranches of options.  The first tranche consisted of three million op-
tions . . . and if the value of those options at the end of the five years 
had not appreciated to $50 million, Disney would make up the differ-
ence.  The second tranche consisted of two million options that would 
vest immediately if Disney and Ovitz opted to renew the contract. 
Id. at 703 (internal citations omitted). 
 128 Id. at 703–04. 
 129 Id. at 704 (internal citations omitted). 
 130 Id.   
 131 Id. at 704. 
 132 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 713 (noting that the other board members found Ovitz “a 
little elitist for the egalitarian Walt Disney [employees]”). 
 133 Id. at 714. 
 134 Id. at 724. 
 135 Id. 
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employment at Sony, but things did not work out, leaving Disney with 
seemingly only one option—to terminate Ovitz.136  Ovitz was officially 
terminated, without cause, effective December 12, 1996.137  Under the 
terms of his contract, Ovitz was entitled to the NFT, which was valued 
at over $140 million.138
2. The Suit 
Following Ovitz’s termination, plaintiff shareholders initiated 
the derivative action, alleging that the Disney directors breached 
their fiduciary duties to the corporation, first in approving the OEA, 
and again in terminating Ovitz without cause, thereby entitling him 
to the receipt of the NFT.139  Plaintiffs sought money damages from 
defendant directors and Ovitz and/or rescission of the termination 
agreement, or compensation for Disney’s alleged damages “and dis-
gorgement of Ovitz’s unjust enrichment.”140
In its 2003 decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery deter-
mined that, based on an investigation of the “tools at hand,” plaintiffs 
alleged sufficient facts that, “if true, arguably support . . . plaintiffs’ 
claims for relief . . . and are sufficient to excuse demand and to state 
claims that warrant development of a full record.”141  Specifically, the 
court was referring to allegations that Eisner made the decision to 
hire Ovitz unilaterally and without fully informing the rest of the 
board about the employment agreement, and that the board likewise 
played virtually no role in deciding the terms of Ovitz’s termina-
tion.142
In considering defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court phrased 
the issue as whether the plaintiffs alleged “particularized facts that 
raise doubt about whether the challenged transaction is entitled to 
the protection of the business judgment rule.”143  In finding for the 
plaintiffs, the court held that “[a] fair reading of the . . . complaint . . 
. gives rise to a reason to doubt whether the board’s actions were 
taken honestly and in good faith . . . .”144  The court further found 
that “the facts belie any assertion that the . . . Boards exercised any 
 136 Id. at 728. 
 137 Id. at 734. 
 138 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 825 A.2d 275, 279, 286 (Del. 
Ch. 2003). 
 139 Id. at 277–79. 
 140 Id. at 278. 
 141 Id. at 279. 
 142 Id. at 287–89. 
 143 Id. at 285–86. 
 144 Disney I, 825 A.2d at 286. 
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business judgment or made any good faith attempt to fulfill the fidu-
ciary duties they owed to Disney and its shareholders.”145  The court 
therefore found that the evidence presented raised a “reason to 
doubt” that defendants should be afforded the protection of the 
business judgment rule.146
C. Disney II 
The Delaware Court of Chancery rendered its decision regard-
ing the Disney litigation in August of 2005.147  The stage was set for 
the court to do a “rigorous job of protecting shareholders.”148  The 
court, however, ruled for defendants on all counts, holding that the 
accused board members had not breached their fiduciary duties to 
the corporation and that the decision to terminate Ovitz and to make 
the subsequent NFT payment did not constitute waste.149  The Court 
of Chancery further confirmed the viability of the business judgment 
rule, declaring that “fiduciaries who act faithfully and honestly on 
behalf of those whose interests they represent are indeed granted 
wide latitude in their efforts to maximize shareholders’ invest-
ment.”150  After a brief review of the history of the rule, the court went 
on to examine whether the protections of the rule should apply to 
each defendant on a director-by-director basis.151
1. The Decision to Hire Ovitz 
The court first concluded that Eisner did not breach his duty of 
care in deciding to hire Ovitz via the extension of a highly lucrative 
employment contract.152  “[L]iability for a breach of the duty of care 
 145 Id. at 287. 
 146 Id. at 289–90. 
 147 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 148 Fairfax, supra note 2, at 419 (quoting Marc Gunther, Ovitz v. Eisner: Boards Be-
ware!, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 176).  In fact, following the Disney I decision, for-
mer Delaware Court of Chancery Judge William Allen noted that the decision could 
hint that “the Delaware courts are responding to the Enron and WorldCom head-
lines and the intrusion, so to speak, of the federal government into the internal gov-
ernance of corporations.”  Id. at 418 (internal citations omitted).  According to Fair-
fax, this statement “confirmed the impact that Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley had on 
Delaware courts’ willingness to increase directors’ liability in order to ensure greater 
adherence to directors’ fiduciary responsibilities.”  Id. at 418. 
 149 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 697.  This decision was later affirmed by the Delaware Su-
preme Court.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35–36 (Del. 2006). 
 150 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 697–98. 
 151 Id. at 756–79. 
 152 Id. at 762. 
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can arise . . . ‘from a board decision that results in a loss because that 
decision was ill advised or ‘negligent’ . . . [or] from an unconsidered 
failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention 
would, arguably, have prevented the loss.’”153  Any decision made by a 
director, of course, is entitled to the protections of the business 
judgment rule, which raises the standard of review to gross negli-
gence.154
Based on a prior ruling, the court determined that a considera-
tion of any improper motives or non-independence of the board 
members would not be appropriate.155  The court therefore framed 
the issue of Eisner’s liability as whether plaintiffs could “demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Eisner was either grossly 
negligent or acted in bad faith in connection with Ovitz’s hiring and 
the approval of the OEA.”156  “[I]n order for a plaintiff to successfully 
plead that the directors acted with gross negligence . . . the plaintiff 
should articulate ‘facts that suggest a wide disparity between the proc-
ess the directors used . . . and that which would have been ra-
tional.’”157
Here, Eisner made the decision to hire Ovitz, as well as what 
terms to offer him, virtually unilaterally.158  Two members of the 
board initially denounced the decision.159  The corporation’s com-
pensation committee met for only one hour to review the anticipated 
terms of the OEA, and this was not the only subject of the meeting.160  
At an executive meeting held later the same day, the board voted 
unanimously to elect Ovitz as Disney’s new president.161  By this point, 
Ovitz and Eisner had already signed a letter agreement outlining the 
terms of Ovitz’s employment, and a press release had been made an-
nouncing Ovitz’s hiring.162
Despite these factual findings, the court dismissed all charges 
against defendants, spending a good deal of its time distinguishing 
 153 Id. at 749 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 
(Del. Ch. 1996)). 
 154 Id. at 762. 
 155 Id. at 762 n.495 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 257–58 (Del. 2000)). 
 156 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 762. 
 157 Id. at 750 n.429 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 n.39 (Del. Ch. 
2003)). 
 158 Id. at 762. 
 159 Id. at 706. 
 160 Id. at 708. 
 161 Id. at 710. 
 162 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 708.  Both of these events took place on August 14, 1995. 
Id.  The compensation committee meeting was held on September 26, 1995, and 
Ovitz officially assumed his position on October 1, 1995.  Id. at 708, 711. 
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Disney II from Van Gorkom.163  While noting that the factual similarities 
between the two cases were “striking,” the court ultimately distin-
guished Van Gorkom on four main grounds.164  First, the court found 
that the transaction in Van Gorkom was “fundamentally different” 
from the one at issue in Disney II because the merger decision in Van 
Gorkom was more material to Trans Union than was the decision to 
hire Ovitz to Disney.165  Second, although the board in Disney II spent 
less time in making its decision than did the Trans Union board, the 
time spent was “not insignificant.”166  Third, unlike the members of 
the Trans Union board, the Disney board was “provided with a term 
sheet of the key terms of the OEA and a presentation was made by 
[knowledgeable board members].”167  Finally, whereas Trans Union’s 
senior managers were in complete opposition to the merger, Disney’s 
management “generally saw Ovitz’s hiring as a boon for the Com-
pany.”168
In distinguishing the cases in such a manner, the court drew a 
very fine line between rational and irrational action.  Indeed, simi-
larly to Van Gorkom, a press release announcing Ovitz’s hiring was 
made before the board had voted on the issue, and before most of the 
board was fully informed about the issue.169  In fact, an argument can 
 163 Id. at 766–70. 
 164 Id. at 767. 
 165 Id. at 768 n.533 (noting that Eisner’s procedure of entering into the letter 
agreement without prior board authorization and the compensation committee’s 
approval of the OEA “based upon a term sheet and upon less than an hour of discus-
sion, seem[ ] eminently reasonable given the OEA’s (relatively small) economic 
size”).  The consideration of the reasonableness of the decision based on economic 
terms runs counter to the basic premise of the business judgment rule that courts 
should not evaluate the substantive merits of board decisions.  Courts should not be 
swayed by the economic reasonableness of a transaction if the process by which the 
decision was reached is fundamentally flawed.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858, 875 (Del. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of other sound valuation information, the 
fact of a premium alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess the 
fairness of an offering price.”). 
 166 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 768. 
 167 Id. at 769. 
 168 Id. 
 169 The court tried to downplay this fact by noting that the directors’ “level of 
knowledge or involvement before [the date of the meeting] is only relevant insofar 
as it informs the Court as to their accumulated knowledge on September 26, when 
the business judgment was made” and that the letter agreement “was expressly sub-
ject to the approval of the board and compensation committee.”  Disney II, 907 A.2d 
at 767 n.522.  This assertion seems contrary to the principle presented in Van Gorkom 
that “[t]he determination of whether a business judgment is an informed one turns 
on whether the directors have informed themselves prior to making a business decision, 
of all material information reasonably available to them.”  Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 
872 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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be made that Eisner’s conduct was worse than that of Trans Union’s 
Chairman and CEO, Jerome W. Van Gorkom.  Van Gorkom at least 
presented the illusion that other courses of action were possible.170  
Here, there were no alternatives—Eisner wanted Ovitz and only 
Ovitz. 
Another distinction, not emphasized by the court, is that in Van 
Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court analyzed the board as a 
whole.171  The Disney II court evaluated liability on a director-by-
director basis, indicating that the duty of care is a duty owed by each 
individual director as an individual.172  Since no one director’s con-
duct on his own was worthy of culpability, the court could not impose 
liability on any one of them.173  This result gives rise to the question of 
whether a different decision would have been reached if the board 
had been examined collectively. 
2. The Decision to Terminate Ovitz 
The court also concluded that Eisner, who “alone possessed the 
authority to terminate Ovitz and grant him the NFT,” did not breach 
his fiduciary duties and acted in good faith taking such action.174  In a 
statement of seeming sympathy for Eisner, the court noted, “Eisner 
unexpectedly found himself confronted with a situation that did not 
have an easy solution.”175
The court found that Eisner was entitled, in his capacity as CEO, 
to make what he considered to be the “best” decision regarding how 
to handle the problems with Ovitz.176  The court further concluded 
that Eisner was entitled to rely on defendant Litvack’s statement that 
he had consulted with outside counsel with regard to whether Ovitz 
could be fired with cause, notwithstanding the court’s declaration 
that it was “not convinced that Litvack did indeed speak with [outside 
counsel] regarding the cause issue.”177
3. Ideal Practices Distinguished From Legal Practices 
Notwithstanding its decision in favor of defendants, the court 
did acknowledge that the Disney board, especially Eisner, was respon-
 170 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868. 
 171 Id. at 889. 
 172 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 760. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 777–78. 
 175 Id. at 778. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 778 n.591. 
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sible for some wrongdoing.178  The court hedged this view, however, 
by proclaiming that “[t]his court strongly encourages directors and 
officers to employ best practices . . . .  But Delaware law does not—
indeed, the common law cannot—hold fiduciaries liable for a failure 
to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices . . . .”179
This statement, on its face, could be an indication that Delaware 
will be applying the business judgment rule strictly in the future.  
Upon closer consideration of the opinion as a whole, however, a dif-
ferent conclusion can be drawn.  While the court ruled for the de-
fendants, it noted that “[f]or the future, many lessons of what not to 
do can be learned from defendants’ conduct here.”180  Additionally, 
and perhaps more significantly, the court stated: 
Recognizing the protean nature of ideal corporate governance 
practices, particularly over an era that has included the Enron 
and WorldCom debacles, and the resulting legislative focus on 
corporate governance, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the 
actions (and the failures to act) of the Disney board that gave rise 
to this lawsuit took place ten years ago, and that applying 21st cen-
tury notions of best practices in analyzing whether those decisions were ac-
tionable would be misplaced.181
This statement is undoubtedly reminiscent of Caremark182 and its ref-
erence to changes in federal regulations.  It can therefore be viewed 
as an indication that cases in which the “21st century notions of best 
practices” need to be applied will arise in the future.183
Further, while it is not entirely clear what those best practices 
may be, the Disney II court did provide some guidance on this matter.  
For example, the court suggested that more detailed documentation 
might be required in the future.184  In discussing the minutes of the 
 178 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 760–61.  For example, the court recognized that 
Eisner to a large extent is responsible for the failings in process that in-
fected and handicapped the board’s decisionmaking abilities.  Eisner 
stacked his (and I intentionally write ‘his’ as opposed to ‘the Com-
pany’s’) board of directors with friends and acquaintances who . . . 
were certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and support uncon-
ditionally than truly independent directors. 
Id.  The court further noted that “Eisner’s actions in connection with Ovitz’s hiring 
should not serve as a model for fellow executives and fiduciaries to follow.  His lapses 
were many. . . . He stretched the outer boundaries of his authority as CEO by acting without 
specific board direction or involvement.”  Id. at 762–63 (emphasis added). 
 179 Id. at 697. 
 180 Id. at 760. 
 181 Id. at 697 (emphasis added). 
 182 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 183 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 697. 
 184 Id. at 768 n.539. 
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board meeting at which the OEA was approved, the court noted that 
“[i]t would have been extremely helpful to the Court if the minutes 
had indicated in any fashion that the discussion relating to the OEA 
was longer and more substantial than the discussion relating to the 
myriad of other issues brought before the compensation committee 
that morning.”185
In addition, with respect to expert advice, the court observed 
that while it is not “necessary for an expert to make a formal presen-
tation at the committee meeting in order for the board to rely on that 
expert’s analysis, . . . that certainly would have been the better course 
of action.”186  The court further seemed troubled by Eisner’s “Ma-
chiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO,” thus suggesting that 
Delaware will be looking more closely at the issue of director inde-
pendence in the future.187  While the court did not go so far as to say 
explicitly that such issues would play a more important role in future 
cases, there was the implication that these suggestions should be 
heeded seriously. 
V. A NEW STANDARD FOR DIRECTOR CONDUCT? 
Disney II teaches important lessons about what is expected of di-
rectors—lessons that boards seem to be in need of in recent times.  
While insufficient to impose liability, the conduct characterized as 
“ordinary negligence” by the Disney II court provides insight as to how 
board members can meet the “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate 
governance practices . . . that go beyond the minimal legal require-
ments” 188—requirements that were apparently satisfied by the Disney 
board.  The board should take an active role in the management of 
the business, not leaving the CEO to “enthrone[ ] himself as the om-
nipotent and infallible monarch of his [own] personal Magic King-
dom . . . .”189  Further, directors should fully inform themselves, using 
all available resources, before making critical decisions affecting the 
company, and fully document any and all board meetings.190
These lessons, taken together with Caremark, have implications 
for director conduct and the business judgment rule in Delaware.  If 
one likens Sarbanes-Oxley to the federal Sentencing Guidelines that 
motivated the decision in Caremark, one can readily conclude that 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 769. 
 187 Id. at 760. 
 188 Id. at 745 n.399 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000)). 
 189 Disney II, 907 A.2d at 763. 
 190 See id. at 764–65. 
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boards will be strongly encouraged, if not required, to hold them-
selves to higher standards in future corporate decision-making.191  Af-
ter all, as Caremark has shown, best practices can evolve into the in-
dustry standard—especially when encouraged by courts and new 
federal regulations.192
The business judgment rule remains an “elusive” aspect of cor-
porate law,193 yet Disney provides clues as to its ultimate formulation in 
Delaware.  While critics of the rule argue either that it allows direc-
tors too much freedom in corporate decision-making194 or that it re-
stricts directors from properly exercising their management duties,195 
the relevant case law reveals that any restrictions imposed by the 
business judgment rule can be better explained by examining the 
context in which it is applied.  While the basic definitions of fiduciary 
duties may not change over time, history may change the way in 
which those definitions are utilized.196  Where the historical context 
requires a heightening of the standards by which director conduct is 
to be judged (for example, following a series of corporate scandals 
implicating director action/inaction), any application of the business 
judgment rule should be altered accordingly.  The logical result is as 
follows: the higher the standards against which director conduct is 
examined, the less likely it is that the business judgment rule will pro-
tect decisions that do not conform to those standards.  Viewed this 
way, the rule seeks to restrict director conduct only as far as is neces-
sary to ensure that directors conduct themselves in accordance with 
their fiduciary obligations. 
Thus, if Delaware directors heed the “suggestions” of Disney II, 
this decision has the potential to reshape the way shareholder deriva-
tive actions are reviewed.  The business judgment rule would still not 
examine substantive decisions.  The rule would only look at the pro-
cedural aspect of a board’s decision making, asking either “was the 
decision informed or in bad faith?” or “based on the procedures, was 
 191 See Veasey, supra note 25, at 850 (“Today, the ‘utter failure’ to follow the mini-
mum expectations of the evolving standards of director conduct [and] the minimum 
expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley . . . might . . . raise a good-faith issue.”). 
 192 See Brown, supra note 5, at 6.  Brown noted that the Caremark decision “has fu-
eled the discussion of the board’s role in ensuring compliance. . . .  As a result, direc-
tors would be well advised to attend to the corporation’s compliance efforts, even in 
the absence of a definitive statement of the board’s responsibility.”  Id. 
 193 Id. at 11. 
 194 See generally Fairfax, supra note 2. 
 195 See generally Bainbridge, supra note 71. 
 196 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
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this a breach of fiduciary duty?”  The difference, that which will hold 
directors more accountable, will be the scrutiny with which proce-
dures are examined.  For example, a decision may be “uninformed” if 
there are inadequate minutes to show what was actually discussed at a 
board meeting, or if the board did not consult an expert with respect 
to the decision.  Additionally, a failure to comply with the provisions 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be considered to be in bad faith.  In 
short, the best practices articulated by the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery have the potential to become the new standards against which 
director conduct is measured when evaluating a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim. 
IV.     CONCLUSION 
While it may be true that courts cannot impose liability upon 
corporate directors for deviating from paradigmatic conduct, it is also 
true that both courts and directors need guidance when it comes to 
evaluating decisions in a way to promote the best interests of the cor-
poration and its shareholders.  Based on the progression of the Disney 
litigation, it became clear that a shift toward more stringent standards 
for directors was expected, at least up to the point of the 2005 deci-
sion.  It is also clear, however, that such a shift did not occur.  But the 
Disney decision does provide clues for the future. 
As the Delaware Court of Chancery itself noted, “[u]nlike ideals 
of corporate governance, a fiduciary’s duties do not change over 
time.  How we understand those duties may evolve and become re-
fined, but the duties themselves have not changed, except to the extent 
that fulfilling a fiduciary duty requires obedience to other positive law.”197  
This statement likely refers to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and to other 
acts that may be passed in the future, perhaps some as a result of 
Delaware’s inaction in this instance. 
But the statement may have more broad-reaching implications.  
After all, the nature of fiduciary duties, like ideals of corporate gov-
ernance, needs to change with the “law” of society.198  This change 
can be accomplished by applying the business judgment rule by 
measuring director conduct against those “ideals of corporate gov-
ernance.”  The business judgment rule examines board procedures.  
If those procedures are required to comport with the ideals, or at 
least above average standards, of corporate governance, the business 
judgment rule will become a mechanism whereby courts can mean-
 197 Id. (emphasis added). 
 198 Id. 
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ingfully evaluate board decisions without sacrificing either account-
ability or authority. 
Perhaps the Delaware Court of Chancery can be taken at its 
word that one of the reasons no liability was imposed on the Disney 
directors was that the conduct in question took place ten years before 
the collapse of Enron.  If this is the case, the business judgment rule 
will look somewhat different in the future.  While preventing review 
of the substantive decisions of directors, the rule’s presumption may 
be overcome by a showing of a violation of one of the suggested pro-
cedures in Disney.  In any event, the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
through its decision in Disney, has sent a powerful message to corpo-
rate directors: even though fiduciary duties do not change, standards 
of director conduct do, and directors should be prepared to meet the 
standards implicitly imposed by the court in Disney in the future. 
